T HE QUESTION we raise is one which presents very clearly in contemporary Catholicism. On the one hand, most Catholics would unhesitatingly speak of their Christian heritage as a "religion"; those educating young people in the following of Christ commonly speak of what they are doing as "religious education." On the other hand, many Catholicsthose seeking genuine renewal through a healthy criticism of the historical forms Catholicism has assumed-will find attractive the thesis proposed in more than one recent publication: that genuine renewal will be found in the abolition of "religion" and the rediscovery of "faith." According to this thesis, "religion" is a man-made security, while "faith" is a response to the living God's invitation to step forth in a journey of discovery.
relevant statements... are ambiguous, contradictory, in need of clarification, and therefore misleading."
11 Luther acknowledged, in fact, that his teaching concerning "passive righteousness" was not without its perplexing aspects:
The righteousness which derives from us is not Christian righteousness, and we are not justified by it. Christian righteousness is the direct opposite, the passive righteousness which we merely receive, in which we effect nothing, but through which we allow someone else to work within us, that is, God. This is not understood by the world... even Christians understand it with difficulty This distinction must be carefully considered. I am not yet master of it." 12 Manns points out that there is an unresolved tension in Luther's thought between this principle of "passive righteousness" and his recognition that the justified man bears fruits which are the expression of his being justified. 13 He concludes: "Luther did not succeed in specifying good works in the sense of free cooperation in such a way that, without denying or limiting grace, they might be seen to have true causality and necessity for salvation. But it does not follow from this... that he denies all cooperation, or so radically asserts God's operation that all other activity is excluded."
14
When the neo-orthodox movement within Protestantism set out to counter the positions which had been adopted by liberal Protestantism, it concentrated its attack upon the assumption that Christianity is a "religion." Bonhoeffer acknowledges Karl Barth as the leader in this attack: "Barth was the first to realize the mistake" those still following the path of liberal theology "were making in leaving clear a space for 12 Cited by Ebeling, Luther 122. 13 Manns cites such passages as "Therefore faith always justifies and makes alive; and yet it does not remain alone, that is, idle. Not that it does not remain alone on its own level and in its own function, for it always justifies alone. But it is incarnate and becomes man; that is, it neither is nor remains idle or without love"; and "First, there must be a tree, then the fruit. For apples do not make a tree, but a tree makes apples. So faith first makes the person, who afterwards performs works" (130). Manns comments: "It is significant that Luther avoids the verse that closes the parable in Matthew: 'Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire* (7:19)" (130). Cf. McDonough, "The Transforming Power of Faith," The Law and the Gospel 45-52.
14 Manns continues: "Therefore Luther's emphasis on fides absoluta attains only a negative theological clarity in the denial of any form of justification by works. In spite of the conflict of intentions we pointed out, Luther's positive portrayal remains open to realizing the intention of fides incarnata" (131). religion in the world or against the world. He brought in against religion the God of Jesus Christ, pneuma against sarx" 15 For Barth, theology faces an alternative: either "what we think we know of the nature and incidence of religion must serve as a norm and principle by which to explain the revelation of God" or vice versa "we have to interpret the Christian religion and all other religions by what we are told by God's revelation." 16 He saw liberal Protestantism as having followed Schleiermacher along the first of these paths; he strove to recover the authentic principles of the tradition of the Reformation by resolutely setting out upon the latter path. He aimed to uphold "the religion of revelation" and denounced an interpretation of the Christian faith as "the revelation of religion."
17
Barth initiated this criticism of "religion" in his Epistle to the Romans, though, as Bonhoeffer has observed, at this stage he was still hampered by "all the Kantian egg-shells" 18 through which he was finding his way. But it was in Church Dogmatics that he wrestled mightily with the whole question. 19 No one with theological sensitivity could read this text without being profoundly moved-by the breadth of his scholarship, by the depth to which he carries his discussion, and by the greatness of a theological synthesis which carries the Reformed tradition to the limits of its achievement.
Barth sees "the revelation of God as the abolition of religion." As a preliminary to the upholding of this thesis, he undertakes a far-reaching review of "the problem of religion in theology." 20 He notes that for Aquinas "the concept of religion as a general concept, to which the Christian religion must be subordinated as one with others, was obviously quite foreign." The problem "could not have any great importance until after the Renaissance." 21 For Barth, the discovery of "religion" was part of the "self-discovery of man" which took place between the Renaissance and the 19th century. 22 As he points out, "Calvin spoke of the religio Christiana even in the title of his chef d'oeuvre. But when he did so he was not conscious of making Christiana the predicate of something human in a neutral and universal sense. What Calvin describes... is wholly a normative concept which he has derived from Holy Scripture, and in which the universal is sublimated in the particular, religion in revelation, and not vice versa" beginning of the 18th century"; after this, one witnessed the "dreaded results of the reversal of revelation and religion." 24 Revelation's "superiority which does not allow us even to consider religion except in the light of revelation" was lost sight of, and revelation and religion were put on the same level.
26
Barth saw "religion" as having a twofold origin in man: (1) deriving from natural theology's attempt to grasp God in a conception measured by human truth, and (2) deriving from the dynamism of conscience as it seeks an interior security in the fulfilment of law.
26 Even the redeemed Christian, because he is a "justified sinner," 27 is tempted to seek the human security of religion and to retranslate the message of the New Testament "into a document of religion." In truth, however, Barth sees both Testaments as condemning religion. 28 The message of revelation leaves no place for religion: "revelation is the truth beside which there is no other truth... only lying and wrong"; 29 revelation judges all religion as an attempt to anticipate God's utterly new truth; 30 "by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ... we can characterize religion as idolatry and self-righteousness, and in this way show it to be unbelief."
31
Berth's theological interpretation of the worship of the believer-his "religious" actions as a Christian-is grounded in his understanding of justification:
No religion is true... it can become true only in the way in which man is justified, from without; i.e. not of its own nature and being, but only in virtue of a reckoning and adopting and separating which are foreign to its own nature and being, which are quite inconceivable from its own standpoint, which come to it quite apart from any qualifications or merits. Like justified man religion is a creature of grace. But grace is the revelation of God. No religion can stand before it as true religion. No man is righteous is its presence The abolishing of religion by revelation need not mean only its negation: the judgment that religion is unbelief. Religion can just as well be exalted in revelation, even though the judgment still stands. It can be upheld by it and concealed in it, and-we must say-sanctified. Bonhoeffer was critical of Bultmann's attempt to remove a religious dimension no longer appropriate to contemporary man: "You can't, as Bultmann supposes, separate God and miracle, but you must be able to interpret and proclaim both in a "non-religious' sense. Bultmann's approach is fundamentally still a liberal one (i.e. abridging the gospel), whereas I'm trying to think theologically. '' 40 Bonhoeffer found it difficult to formulate what he had in mind: "I'm only gradually working my way to the non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts; the job is too big for me to finish yet." 41 But he outlined in a few lines a projected book which would take up this question, concluding: "Our relation to God is not a 'religious' relationship to the highest, most powerful, and best Being imaginable-that is not authentic transcendence-but our relation to God is a new life in 'existence for others,' through participation in the being of Jesus."
MEANING OF "RELIGION": HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Before we continue this discussion, it is necessary to clarify further what we mean when we speak of "religion." A term means what it is intended to mean, and the meaning intended by the term has not been the same in different historical epochs.
William James's definition sums up in general terms what the term signifies in today's usage: "The feelings, acts, and experiences of men so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." Attempts to formulate a more precise definition encounter no small difficulty, as the authors of modern encyclopedic articles acknowledge. 43 These scholars have recourse to a phenomenological description of "religion," as a particular sphere of human activity, and of its peculiar "object," the "divine" or "sacred." But such a description is too comprehensive to carry us far towards the solution of the theological problem we have raised. Religion in this sense takes in both faith and religion, which, according to the terms of our problem, we wish to compare and contrast.
A historical perspective of the changing sense in which "religion" has been used is already enlightening. The Oxford English Dictionary records an evolution of meaning in the usage of the English language. 44 Apart from reference to the vowed life, the earliest reference of the term is to 40 Ibid. 285. This text continues, echoing Berth's understanding of the origin of religion: "What does it mean "to interpret in a religious sense'? I think it means to speak on the one hand metaphysically, and on the other hand individualistically. Neither of these is relevant to the biblical message or to the man of today" (285-86 cultic expression: "action or conduct indicating belief in, reverence for, and desire to please, a divine ruling power; the exercise or practice of rites or observances implying this" (from A.D. 1225). A more comprehensive meaning is found from the beginning of the 14th century; "a particular system of faith and worship." And from the mid-16th century a meaning is found which is similar to the definition of William James already cited: "Recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and being entitled to obedience, reverence and worship; the general mental and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effects upon the individual and the community etc." Thus English usage parallels the findings of Barth's review of theological literature in Europe: that the recognition of religion as a comprehensive category paralleled the emergence of modern man's critical awareness of himself after the Renaissance.
The meaning of the term for Aquinas parallels the earliest English usage: religion is the virtue which gives to God the cultic reverence which is his due (cf. Sum. theoL 2-2, q. 81, a. 3). This usage has a long history. The term thrëskeia is to be found in Wisdom 14:16-18 and James 1:2e.
45
Together with this meaning emphasizing cultic expression and evidently derived from it, a more general meaning is found. When Paul says of himself "I followed the strictest party in our religion and lived as a Pharisee" (Acts 26:5), he is speaking in this comprehensive sense of the Jewish way of life; but this way of life is still seen as measured by cultic practice. In the same perspective Aquinas refers to the whole economy of the Christian life as "Christiana religio" (Prologue of Sum. theoL). Barth has already recalled for us that the same concept is found in the title of Calvin's work.
Until the end of the 18th century, however, religion in this broadest sense was identified with a whole culture or way of life. one of the first books to regard it as an isolable subject. Prior to that a religious tradition was identified with the cultural tradition that provided the fundamental means of individual and social identification. Traditionally, religion referred to the basic guiding images and principles of an individual and a culture. Religion was identical with style of life.
46
With this development-which brings us to the concept taken up in the contemporary encyclopedias we have referred to-came the systematic attempts to define and interpret this separate sphere of human life to which the term is applied. Bettis reviews these essays. Schleiermacher's interpretation was soò/ect-centered; he saw religion as specified by the uniqueness of human psychic faculties; we give the name "God" to the correlate of a unique feeling of absolute dependence. 47 Paul Tillich also locates the essence of religion subjectively, but for him it is not a separate component of human life but an ultimate dimension of all human existence, influencing every segment of our human activity.
48
Other scholars have given emphasis to the object of the religious response. Rudolf Otto names this unique object "the numinous." 49 G. van der Leeuw characterizes this object as "power."
50
Mircea Eliade proposes a dialectic or relational understanding of religion. He judges that religious activity is "best defined, not in terms of object (power, being etc.) or in terms of subjectivity (immanent selfawareness, depth dimension, need for social stability etc.) but in terms of the way in which men relate to the object of their attention... what makes a situation 'religious' is neither the subjective element nor the objective element, but the way in which these elements come in contact." 51 This insight seems to be of great importance for an understanding of how Christian theology may come to an understanding of the place of religion in a wholesome expression of the fulness of the Christian mystery, and I shall return to it below.
The emergence of awareness of the peculiarly "religious" dimension of human existence is a development which has importance for Christian theology; it invites new reflections upon the manner in which the Chris tian mystery is realized in human history. These reflections were initiated with the essays of liberal Protestantism. But this work had serious shortcomings and merited Barth's criticism that the order of norms had been turned upside down: religion as a universal human experience became the measure against which the Christian mystery was understood. The reaction of Barth and Emil Β runner was grounded in the principles of the Reformation. We must now ask whether the Catholic tradition can make its contribution to the discussion, and whether this contribu tion calls for a modification of the position taken by Barth.
CONTRIBUTION OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGY
Bernard Lonergan's influential study Method in Theology 52 may well serve as a starting point. Lonergan's objective is to provide an explanation of theological method which is intelligible to any reasonable inquirer. To achieve this, he looks to "religion" (understood as a field of self-tran scendent love) to provide the all-embracing framework of methodological analysis. He sees this love as expressed in a variety of traditions, Chris tian and otherwise. Thus he provides a foundation not only for tolerance but also for collaboration beyond the bounds of particular religious creeds.
Our discussion to this point alerts us to the inherent difficulties the Christian theologian will meet working within such a perspective. What is the relationship between religion thus conceived and Christian faith? In the long run theological methodology will only be convincing when it brings man into immediate contact with the subject matter itself, and in the last analysis this is, once and for all, not faith and the theology that goes with it, but that which is the object of faith, because faith itself is only itself when it surrenders itself to that which it itself is not, even while the man of faith is convinced that this greater entity which he cannot comprehend can become an event in this faith of his.
58
Kelly judges that the sensitivities echoed in this passage make Rahner critical of an approach to Lonergan's work which would see it as providing a total theological methodology. 69 For Rahner, mystery, not method, is fundamental... the notion of mystery... really enters into the inner vitality of his transcendental method... a rather powerful notion, and in considerable contrast to such a category as Method describes, where it is more a surplus notion, almost to the discomfort of theology, as a source of problems. Because Rahner would view mystery as the incomprehensible nearness of God to man mediated to us through Christ and his Spirit, theology must be considered as the "science of mystery." He recognizes that this may be a hard saying for the modern scientific mentality, but, at least this is where its distinction lies.
60
Our problem is one, therefore, which is not far from the preoccupations of contemporary Catholic scholarship. At least one writer has taken it up in explicit terms. M. D. Chenu suggests that the key to its resolution is to be found in "the classical distinction between faith and religionbetween faith the 'theological' virtue, and religion, the 'moral' virtue." of the kind we associate with scholasticism. Quite rightly, contemporary theology emphasizes a comprehensive understanding which contrasts with the analysis of scholasticism. Meeting the exigencies of a historical moment which calls for the recovery of a total vision, today's theology stresses the intelligibility of the existential totality, of the situation, of "the story," of "the message"; the scholastic approach, on the other hand, sought to analyze the intelligibility of particular elements and dimensions of the reality of the Christian mystery. We are at present in the midst of a reaction against the inadequacies of a theology which made almost exclusive use of the scholastic method. But these two approaches are not exclusive of one another; they are complementary; and if one is to explore basic theological issues satisfactorily, they must both be made use of.
The analysis of Aquinas proposes an explanation of the "classical distinction" to which Chenu refers. For St. Thomas, religion is a "virtue." According to his Aristotelian analysis, he assigns virtue to the genus of "quality"; 62 this does not imply for him a static reality-he views virtue in a dynamic fashion, as a perfection added to a power. 63 In seeking to differentiate the complex realities embraced by the generic term "virtue," Thomas looks to the specification coming from the intentionality of different virtuous qualities. "Virtue" in general is a dynamic confirmation towards "the good," superadded to the human person's basic inclinations; this confirmation is diversified according to the specific goods to which various virtues are directed.
64
The most fundamental distinction to be recognized among virtues arises from the fact that their qualitative intentionality may be directed, on the one hand, towards a good which "does not exceed the connatural capacity of man," or, on the other hand, towards a good which is "supernatural." The former are "natural" virtues; the latter are "super natural," insofar as their qualitative intentionality "cannot be acquired by human acts but is 'infused' by God." 65 It is clear that the theological problem we are discussing concerns virtues which are of the "super natural" order. One agrees with Luther that "works-righteousness" which is independent of God's grace can have no salutary effect; the real problem concerns the acts of a human person realized through God's grace.
Aquinas' analytical comparison of the virtues which are the principles of such acts leads him to recognize that they must be radically differen tiated into two kinds: again by reason of the good to which their intentionality is directed. The "theological virtues" (faith, hope, and charity) bring a supernatural intentionality which is concerned immedi- ately with the ultimate good which is God Himself, acting on man's behalf in Jesus Christ. "These three" which "abide" (1 Cor 13:13) are the heart of the Christian destiny, which is nothing less than the self-communication of a loving and merciful God. Other virtues are concerned immediately with those created goods which man must embrace as he pursues the possession of the ultimate good.
66 These latter Thomas calls "moral virtues"; and among them he recognizes four families of virtues-prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance-which he calls "cardinal virtues."
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Whereas faith belongs to the theological virtues, religion, for Aquinas, belongs to the family of the moral virtue of justice. The generic good to which the intentionality of the virtue of justice is directed is what is owing to another by right; the specific good to which the intentionality of the virtue of religion is directed is the cult which is owing to God.
68
Chenu, in the article to which I have referred, gives a phenomenology of religion which makes clear the importance of the distinction Aquinas has made. Religion has its origins in the recognition by human beingsusually in no more than a "prereflexive way"-that the concrete realities of their lives and experiences find their ultimate significance in the lived acknowledgment of their being grounded in the transcendent order. In referring them to God, they "sacralize" these realities and experiences. Enshrining them in ritual, they tend to withdraw them from the profane order. The meeting of this fundamental need finds many forms, giving rise to various types of religion and sacralization recognized by sociologists of religion: a useful religion, aimed at reaching mysterious forces; a religion of fear, guaranteeing a measure of security; a religion of homage towards the greatness of the divine absolute; and a religion of communion, which is the highest, because through it the absolute comes to fulfil man's aspirations and raise him above himself. "The common denominator of these needs and religions," Chenu concludes, "is the fact that they ascend from man to the divinity."
69
Chenu contrasts with his description of religion a phenomenological description of Christian faith: 66 Cf. Quaest disp. de virt., a. 12. 67 Sum. theol. 1-2, q. 61, a. 2; 2-2, q. 58, a. 8, ad 2. Aquinas recognizes a great complexity among these families of virtues, distinguishing "integral parts" (qualities which are presupposed for the perfect act of virtue), "subjective parts" (which are species of the one generic virtue), and "potential parts" (which are virtues associated with the principal cardinal virtue as having something in common with it, but which are not properly species of it). Religion is a "potential part" of the virtue of justice (cf. 2-2, q. 80, a. 1).
68 Aquinas notes that "religion" cannot be assigned to the family of justice except with qualification ( Sum. theol 2-2, q. 80, a. 1) . 69 Cf. "The Need for a Theology" 57-58.
Faith, as such, proceeds in exactly the opposite way. Considered phenomenologically, the act of a believer has a totally different inspiration from the religious act just described Faith is not the action of a man ascending toward the Divine. It is the act of response to and of communion with a personal God, who on his own initiative enters into conversation with man and establishes a communion in love. In accordance with the logic of love, this God enters into the life of the "other" and makes himself man in order to bring this act to its full reality. Divinization thus comes by means of a humanization. All this may seem to the unbeliever nothing but myth or illusion, but it is the very object of faith and governs its design and structure
In faith we are dealing with an event. We are no longer in nature but in history To be Christian is to be in relation to a fact-the fact of Christ-to a history, and not to a morality, a law, a theory, or a cult. religion is that of an event-although in this case it still has to be completed. As God is the subject of the one event, so, too, He is of the other. The man Jesus has no prior or abstract existence in the one event but exists only in the unity of God himself: very God and very man. Similarly in the other, man and his religion is to be considered only as the one who follows God because God has preceded the man who bears him, because he is addressed by God.
76
The Catholic tradition would take issue with Barth for not being prepared to accept the full implications of the analogy. While he accepts the implications as far as the unity of the believer with God in Christ is concerned, he is not prepared to accept the implication that in this unity what is essentially and authentically human is saved and owned by God's intervention in Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit. particularly against idolatry in the broad New Testament sense of that word: self-interest easily erodes the unconditional loyalty which belongs only to God, and begins to set up in His place some other reality or institution.
82 Superstition, which seeks an illusory protection in ritual forms, is frequently denounced in the Scriptures; but Catholics have too frequently heard these warnings as applying to the people of the old dispensation rather than to themselves. 83 Religious practices, the Scriptures also warn, can become an occasion of hypocrisy, when externals give the lie to what is in the heart; 84 they can degenerate into legalism, in which observance is no longer the expression of genuine fidelity and commitment; 85 they can lead to blindness and hardness of heart, in which groups cling to flattering illusions and privileges associated with the exercise of office.
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Chenu's analysis of the development of religious institutions points to a criterion whereby one can distinguish authentic religion from inauthentic religiosity. The former is ruled by the human person's genuine need to relate the reality of human life to the transcendent ground of all being; the latter has become, to a greater or lesser degree, an illusory means of meeting other ends, which are essentially psychological and sociological (the need for intelligible order, for security, etc.).
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Within the Christian mystery, as Chenu points out, 88 faith challenges and purifies the forms assumed by religion. Faith introduces a "radical novelty" into the universe of religion. There is a certain pathos in the community and individual life of the Christian believer, as "faith saves religion, by constantly criticizing its mental, cultural and social behaviour":
Always at issue with "religion," faith is ever inventing new relationships with religion and with the world and nature. The psychological, cultural, social, and national conditions of religion provide it with a ground to grow in, but they also threaten to suffocate it. One can without injustice ascribe to it the deviations of 
